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Do Soccer Associations Really Spend on a Good Thing?
Empirical Evidence on Heterogeneity in the Consumer Response
to Match Uncertainty of Outcome
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether previous results describing the effect of uncertainty of
outcome on match attendance in team sports have been driven by heterogeneity in fan demand. We
apply censored quantile regression methods and place particular emphasis on the relationship between
match uncertainty and attendance demand, as previous results are highly ambiguous. This is more
surprising, as each season association and league officials continue to spend millions on enhancing this
uncertainty. We also control for season ticket holders, who are unlikely to be influenced by match
specificities. Based on data from German soccer, our results indicate that fan demand shows
heterogeneity across quantiles and that increasing match uncertainty of outcome exclusively benefits
teams who already face strong attendance demand.
DO SOCCER ASSOCIATIONS REALLY SPEND ON A GOOD THING?
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HETEROGENEITY IN THE CONSUMER
RESPONSE TO MATCH UNCERTAINTY OF OUTCOME
MEN-ANDRI BENZ, LEIF BRANDES and EGON FRANCK*
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether previous results describing the effect
of uncertainty of outcome on match attendance in team sports have been driven by het-
erogeneity in fan demand. We apply censored quantile regression methods and place
particular emphasis on the relationship between match uncertainty and attendance
demand, as previous results are highly ambiguous.This ismore surprising, as each season
association and league officials continue to spendmillions on enhancing this uncertainty.
Wealsocontrol forseasonticketholders,whoareunlikelytobeinfluencedbymatchspeci-
ficities. Based on data from German soccer, our results indicate that fan demand
shows heterogeneity across quantiles and that increasing match uncertainty of out-
come exclusively benefits teams who already face strong attendance demand. (JEL
D12, C14, C24, L83)
I. INTRODUCTION
Analyzing the demand for sport has been of
major interest to many researchers in the field
of sports economics. The sports examined range
fromcricket over rugby to, perhapsmost impor-
tant in Europe, football (or soccer). Whereas
some factors can consistently be found to affect
the demand for sport, the role played by un-
certainty of outcome variables still remains
unclear.1 This is perhaps surprising for two rea-
sons. First, the underlying idea, introduced by
Rottenberg (1956), is rather appealing: Ceteris
paribus, consumers of sport matches value a
higheruncertaintyabouttheoutcomeofamatch;
that is, they prefer matches exhibiting teams of
(almost) equal playing strength within a specific
situation.2
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ABBREVIATIONS
CQR: Censored Quantile Regression
ICE: InterCity Express
ILPA: Iterative Linear Programming Algorithm
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
UOO: Uncertainty of Outcome
UEFA: Union of European Football Associations
VIF: Variance Inflation Factors
1. Following Szymanski (2003), depending on the rele-
vant time span of interest, it is possible to distinguish
between three different types of uncertainty of outcome,
namely seasonal uncertainty (close championship race),
championship uncertainty (absence of long-run domina-
tion), and individual match uncertainty. Throughout this
paper, we are exclusively interested in the last of these.
2. Forrest and Simmons (2002) have argued that
match uncertainty also depends on factors such as
home-field advantage. Thus, it could be that uncertainty
is actually highest when a strong visiting team plays
a ‘‘mediocre’’ team that is particularly strong at home.
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Second, the success of Rottenberg’s idea is
beyond doubt3 as, nowadays, the concept of
competitive balance is omnipresent when it
comes to organizational issues in professional
team sport leagues. In some European leagues
(including Germany), this concept has been
put forward as a justification for centralized
TV rights selling4 combined with revenue shar-
ing. Besides, the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) is redistributing signifi-
cant shares of their revenues from the Cham-
pions League to non-participating clubs in
order to close the financial gap between partic-
ipants and non-participants. This in turn should
result in a more equal distribution of financial
power for the clubs within a league, which is
hoped to maintain a certain degree of com-
petitive balance.5 In other words, based on
Rottenberg’s idea, millions of Euro are spent
each year.6
However, Borland and Macdonald (2003)
and Szymanski (2003) in their extensive liter-
ature reviews state that the empirical results
are far from being unambiguous.7 In this
paper we argue that these results might be
driven by the existence of heterogeneity in
the demand for sport, which has not been
addressed in previous studies: To the best of
our knowledge, all previous studies analyzing
the demand for sport used ordinary least
squares (OLS) or censored normal (Tobit) re-
gression.Whereas these methods differ in their
treatment of censored observations,8 both
exclusively model changes in the conditional
mean. In other words, all previous studies have
(implicitly) assumed that regressors affect
the location of the conditional mean only.
The shape of the distribution, however, would
then not be altered by different values for
the regressors (with the notable exception of
heteroskedasticity).
We are skeptical about this approach. In
particular, we are concerned that an exclusive
focus on average effects might misguide policy
makers in the presence of heterogeneity in con-
sumer demand.9 By heterogeneity, we refer to
a situation in which the group of (statistically)
relevant factors for match attendance demand
varies across different quantiles in the distri-
bution of this demand. More precisely, we
want to allow for the case that the level of
expected demand influences the importance
of influence factors; for instance, it might be
the case that a consumer’s utility from cele-
brating the home team’s victory is increasing
in the number of spectators (whose majority
will also be home team supporters). This
would induce a greater influence from the
home team’s winning probability on atten-
dance demand for large quantiles.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to in-
troduce quantile regression analysis to the
demand for sport, as we believe that this
method provides a fuller picture of the con-
ditional distribution of match attendance
figures. Furthermore, we are able to overcome
the major weakness of the Tobit estimator,
namely the explicit assumption of normally
distributed error terms. However, to allow
for a comparison, results from a Tobit model
are also given within this paper.
Throughout this paper we will analyze
match attendance data from the first division
of professional German Football (soccer) to
determine the effect of match uncertainty of
outcome variables on match attendance.
The focus on match attendance demand stems
from the economic significance of ticket sales
for overall team revenues. This point is further
strengthened by the existence of a positive cor-
relation between a club’s attendance demand
and advertising revenues in subsequent sea-
sons:10 For the seasons 2001/02, 2002/03,
and 2003/04 the combined revenue shares of
ticket sales and advertising in the German
Bundesliga accounted for 39.88%, 45.71%
and 49.53%, respectively.11
Our data contain information onmore than
1,200 matches in the seasons 1999/2000 until
2003/04. For each team we have information
3. Recently, the 50th anniversary of Rottenberg’s
paper was celebrated in the Journal of Political Economy
by Sanderson and Siegfried (2006).
4. See, for example, Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo
(2005) for the UK.
5. Theoretical support for this procedure has come
from, for example,Marburger (1997), who shows how rev-
enue sharing may improve competitive balance.
6. Over the last 6 yr, approximately 215 million Euro
have been redistributed from Champions League revenues
to non-participating clubs from the national leagues; see
Arnaut (2006, p. 145). Moreover, ‘‘enhancing competitive
balance’’ is explicitly mentioned as one of the main direct
benefits to European Football.
7. See Subsection II.A.
8. Due to stadium capacity constraints, censored
observations are regularly encountered in studies about
the demand for sport.
9. See Brandes (2007) for a very preliminary discus-
sion of this aspect.
10. See Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002).
11. Source:Deutsche Fussball Liga, own calculations.
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about the number of season ticket holders.
Thus, we are able to focus on the ‘‘true’’ match
demand by subtracting season tickets from the
observed number of spectators.12 We will refer
to this variable as adjusted ticket demand.
Our empirical results clearly support the
adoption of quantile regression methods to
the demand for sport. Most interesting, we find
strong evidence that match uncertainty of out-
come (UOO) almost exclusively affects matches
exhibiting a strong degree of attendance
demand. Moreover, we are able to obtain the
theoretically predicted signs on all significant
UOOmeasures. In our opinion, this has impor-
tant consequences for league and association
officials, alike; revenue redistribution is intended
to close the financial gap between ‘‘low-
demand’’ teams and ‘‘high-demand’’ teams.13
Based on our empirical findings, however, the
effect from this revenue redistribution on the
league as a whole is twofold: On the one hand,
weak teams are able to spend more money on
player talent. However, the extent to which this
will increase their playing strength (which would
increase attendance demand for home matches)
depends crucially on the efficiency of their talent
investments. If such teams would be able to suc-
ceed in improving their playing strengths, the
reward would also be shared by ‘‘high-demand’’
teams: These teams would profit from a positive
externality—given by a higher degree of match
uncertainty of outcome—as UOO exclusively
affects the high quantiles of match attendance
demand. We conclude that in order to avoid
a wider gap in financial power across teams,
league and association officials should comple-
ment revenue redistribution schemes by appro-
priate governance standards. This should also
increase the need for managerial efficiency with
respect to existing financial resources of teams.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: The next section reviews previous
studies of the relationship between match
attendance and the degree of outcome uncer-
tainty. In Section III we present our data and
discuss our chosen measures of competitive
balance. Section IV contains our empirical
results and Section V concludes.
II. COMPETITIVE BALANCE AND THE DEMAND
FOR SPORT
A. Related Literature
Over the last decade, there has been a huge
varietyof academic research14 about thedemand
for sports ingeneralandtherelationshipbetween
uncertaintyofoutcomevariablesandattendance
figures in particular. Perhaps this has beenmoti-
vated by the fact that, as already mentioned,
league officials refer to this connection as an
excuse for adopting institutional devices like sal-
ary caps, reserve clauses, draft systems or collec-
tive selling, which would usually be subject to
antitrust laws. However, the results on the rela-
tionshipbetween(match)uncertaintyofoutcome
and attendance are mixed.15
Borland and Macdonald (2003) summarize
results from 18 empirical studies based on
match level attendance. Only four of these
studies find a clear positive influence of greater
uncertainty on attendance, five studies present
statistically significant mixed effects and nine
studies come up with negative or statistically
insignificant effects.
As we base our analysis on data for Ger-
man football, those results treating football
matches are of special interest to us. Out of
the 18 studies covered by the survey, seven
were conducted on football data. Out of these,
four studies find statistically negative or insig-
nificant effects, two show a concave relation-
ship, and only one presents a statistically
significant positive influence of greater uncer-
tainty on attendance.
Since the publication of the review by
Borland and MacDonald, several new studies
have been done on match attendance, some of
them proposing newmeasures of match uncer-
tainty of outcome. Since we will rely on a
slightly adjusted version of their proposed
measure, we would like to name Forrest and
Simmons (2006) as a prominent example. The
authors analyze demand for match attendance
12. See Section III for further details.
13. Usually, low-demand (high-demand) teams will
also be the weaker (stronger) teams within a league. How-
ever, within this paper, we will distinguish between teams
on an attendance demand basis.
14. See, for example, Simmons (1996), Dobson and
Goddard (1992), Wilson and Sim (1995) and the recent
work by Owen and Weatherston (2004). Excellent reviews
may be found in Borland and Macdonald (2003) and
Szymanski (2003).
15. As already mentioned in the Introduction, we
place exclusive emphasis on the relationship between
match uncertainty of outcome and match attendance
demand. Therefore, we focus on this relationship within
our literature review. For the effect from seasonal and/
or championship uncertainty on attendance demand,
see also Borland and Macdonald (2003) and Szymanski
(2003).
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in the English Football League. They use an un-
certainty measure, which incorporates home
advantage of home teams.16 However, they do
not find any significant relationship between
matchattendanceanduncertaintyofoutcome.17
Unfortunately, the authors lack information on
season ticket holders, which might result in
biased estimates.
Although not covered by the survey, there
is previous work analyzing individual match
attendance for German football. Czarnitzki
and Stadtmann (2002) analyze match atten-
dance for all teams in the seasons 1996/97
and 1997/98 and provide results from Tobit
estimation. Basically, they find that neither
the short-term nor the medium-term measures
of uncertainty have a significant influence on
match attendance. Their results point at the
dominating influence of a team’s reputation
and its fans’ loyalty on ticket demand.
Roy (2004) analyzes home match attendance
data for six teams in the German Bundesliga
in the period 1998/99–2001/02. Estimating
feasible generalized least squares models for
team revenues from standing and seating
accommodation separately, he finds a positive
influence of the home team’s winning proba-
bility on revenues from standing accommoda-
tion. However, he does not use a quadratic
specification for this measure. Furthermore,
the question of representativeness and survi-
vor bias of these six teams18 arises. Based
on these results, we believe that further anal-
ysis of the German Bundesliga is required.
III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Playing Schedule and Institutional Design
of the Bundesliga
The professional German soccer league
consists of two divisions, namely 1. Bundesliga
(top division) and 2. Bundesliga. Within each
season, 18 teams in the top division compete
with each other for winning the German cham-
pionship, qualifying for international compet-
itions, such as UEFA Champions League
(teams ranked first to third), UEFACup (teams
ranked fourth and fifth) and for avoiding rel-
egation. This latter aspect distinguishes the
league critically from most American sports
leagues, which are referred to in the literature
as closed leagues: In the Bundesliga, at the end
of each season, the three worst performing
teams in the 1. Bundesliga are demoted to the
2. Bundesliga and replaced by the three best
performing teams from the latter.
The playing schedule in the 1. Bundesliga
consists of each team playing each other team
twice within the season, where one match is
played at the team’s home field and the other
at the competitor’s home field. Most of the
matches are played on Saturdays and Sun-
days, starting at 3:30 p.m. (Saturday) or
5.30 p.m. (Sunday). Moreover, a team that
played at home on the previous weekend will
usually have to play ‘‘on the road’’ on the sub-
sequent weekend. Based on this scheduling,
at the end of the season, each team will have
played 34 matches, among them 17 being home
matches.
B. The Data
Our data contains information on over
1,200 individual matches in the first division
of professional German football within the
period 1999–2004. Thus, we are able to study
demand for football over five consecutive
seasons. Besides different measures of match-
specific UOO, we also have detailed informa-
tion on a variety of influence factors, such as
entertainment and team quality proxies (short
and long term), economic factors, and weather
conditions.
Throughout our empirical analysis, we will
use logarithmic adjusted match attendance as
the dependent variable, which has been ob-
tained by subtracting the number of season
ticket holders for the home team from its
observed home match attendance figures within
a particular season. Of course, this is equiv-
alent to the assumption that all season ticket
holders attend each match within a certain
season. Although this assumption may be crit-
icized,19 it seems justified for our analysis
16. See Section III for details.
17. Interestingly, applying the same measure to tele-
vision demand, the authors find a positive influence
from higher uncertainty to demand, whereas another
study onmatch attendance also fails to derive the expected
influence. See Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005) and
Buraimo and Simmons (2006).
18. The choice was based on permanent participation
in the league over the period and an average attendance of
less than 80% of the stadium capacity.
19. We thank Bernd Frick for pointing out to us that
season tickets may allow preferential access to Champions
League (CL) tickets, which might induce consumers to
ensure CL match participation through purchase of sea-
son tickets. It would then be possible that at least some
season-ticket holders would not attend each single match.
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as season ticket holders show a strong habit
persistence independent of match-specific
characteristics.20
Based on these arguments, we can write our
estimation equation as
logðD*it Þ 5 UOOitbþ x#itfþ z#itcþ e#itn
þ w#itkþ eit
t 5 1; . . . ; T ; i 5 1; . . . ; 25:
ð1Þ
where D*it denotes adjusted ticket demand for
a home match21 of team i at time t. Further-
more, xit contains entertainment proxies, zit
denotes team quality variables, eit refers to
economic factors, wit corresponds to weather
variables, and eit denotes the unobserved influ-
ence on attendance.
From Equation (1), it is revealed that we
adopt the standard approach in the sports eco-
nomics literature with respect to the functional
form for the match uncertainty measures
(UOO): At first glance, it might seem as if
we explicitly ruled out the possibility that
the influence from UOO on match attendance
demand varies with the quality of the teams
involved as there is no interaction effect
including team quality and UOO in Equation
(1).22 The reader should note, however, that
the use of quantile regression allows for the
possibility that the extent of the effect of
UOO on attendance demand is still affected
by the quality of teams involved if, as seems
likely, high-quality teams occupy a different
part of the distribution of attendance demand
compared to low-quality teams.
The elements of the other regressor groups
can be found in Table 1. However, through-
out the empirical analysis of this paper, b
from Equation (1) will be our main concern.
It should be clear that—whereas several
measures of UOO are applied across different
specifications (see also below)—the variables
from the other regressor groups always
remain the same.
TABLE 1
Variable Description
Variable Description
Team quality
Hstand Home: league position before
match
Astand Away: league position before
match
Hstand (LS) Home: finishing position previous
season
Astand (LS) Away: finishing position previous
season
HGLM Home: goals last home match
AGLM Away: goals last away match
Hseries3 Dummy 5 1, if home team won
previous 3 matches
Aseries4 Dummy 5 1, if away team won
previous 4 matches
Hbudget Home: Budget (in terms of
2003 Euro)
Abudget Away: Budget (in terms of
2003 Euro)
HREP20 Home: Reputation
AREP20 Away: Reputation
Entertainment proxies
Relegation Dummy 5 1, if Home is in
relegation contention
Championship Dummy 5 1, if Home is in
championship contention
Home: Promoted Dummy 5 1, if Home has been
promoted at the end of the
previous season
Away: Promoted Dummy 5 1, if Away has been
promoted at the end of the
previous season
Economic factors
log(Price) Logarithmic average admission
price
Hmarket Home team market size
DBtime Travel time by train for away
supporters
(DBtime)2 Travel time squared
Unemployed Unemployment rate in home
team area
Midweek Dummy 5 1, if match is
Monday-Thursday
Weather variables
Temp Temperature in 0.1°C
Rain Dummy 5 1, if rain on
match day
Snow Dummy 5 1, if snow on
match day
Within season trend
Fixture Fixture within season
20. Feehan, Forrest, and Simmons (2003) provide evi-
dence from the Premier League that season ticket holders
do indeed attend almost every match within a season.
21. For reasons of readability, we drop the index of
the visiting team. Strictly speaking, we would have to write
Dijt to denote attendance for a home match of team i
against team j at time t.
22. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bring-
ing this to our attention. As a result, we also estimated
a modified version of Equation (1) in which we incorpo-
rated an interaction term including UOO and Hstand.
However, the results did not provide empirical support
for this approach. Therefore, only the results from Equa-
tion (1) are given within this paper. The results for the
modified equation are available from the authors on
request.
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Measuring team quality can be done on sev-
eral time horizons. To control home and away
teams for ‘‘relative’’ performancewithin a given
season, we rely on Hstand and Astand. These
values are used in virtually every empirical
match attendance demand study, for instance
by Garcia and Rodriguez (2002), Roy (2004)
and Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002). Includ-
ing each team’s finishing position in the previ-
ous season, Hstand (LS) and Astand (LS),
allows us to pick up ‘‘vicious’’ and ‘‘virtuous’’
circles of performance as subsequent fan inter-
est might vary with previous performance.23
In order to provide a unified treatment for
all teams, we applied the ranking 19, 20,
and 21 to the best, second and third best pro-
moted teams from the second division in the
previous season, respectively.
Including each team’s number of goals in its
previous home/away match, HGLM and
AGLM, seems justified as anecdotal evidence
suggests that celebrating a team’s goals is at
the core of attending a live match. Besides,
this approach has also previously been taken
by many researchers, such as Garcia and
Rodriguez (2002).
In controlling for winning streaks of the
home and away team, Hseries3 and Aseries4,
we follow Roy (2004), who proposes an asym-
metric length of winning streaks for home and
away team for the following reason: As most
spectators will be supporters of the home
team, these spectators should be expected to
be more responsive to changes in home team
quality aspects than to those of the visiting
team. Thus, they react to winning streaks of
their home team ‘‘earlier’’ than to the winning
streaks of a visiting team. Although we admit
that the numbers of 3 and 4 consecutive wins
may to some extent be arbitrary, the basic idea
of an asymmetric winning streak measure
appealed to us very much.
Including budget information as explana-
tory variables we follow the motivation by
Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005), who
state that the use of budget information
may more fully mirror the quality of teams
than the number of international players,
which might significantly differ in quality,
dependent on the specific national team. Their
argument is based on the existence of a com-
petitive market for player talent.
Based on the empirical results by Czarnitzki
and Stadtmann (2002), who present strong
empirical evidence for the importance of a
team’s ‘‘Reputation’’ on match attendance de-
mand, we decided to include their ‘‘REP20’’
measure for home and visiting team (HREP20
and AREP20). The measure REP20 takes
into account the performance of a particular
team over the last 20 yr according to the fol-
lowing formula:
REP20 5
X20
t51
18
xt
ﬃﬃ
t
p ;ð2Þ
xt is the team’s final rank in the championship
t yr ago. In the case that the team did not
play in the first German league in season t,
the corresponding summand is set equal to
zero. By weighting the rankings with the
square root of the number of years past,
the index is constructed to reflect the depre-
ciating effect of time.
Relegation and Championship are based on
the following assumptions. First, we follow
Roy (2004) with respect to the fact that these
measures are only feasible for match days
29–34. Although we are aware of the fact that
it would be possible to ‘‘cardinalize’’ these
dummy variables, for example, by using a
team’s ‘‘point difference’’ to the league leader
(or the team currently ranked 16th), our mea-
sure has the advantage that it is easier to inter-
pret: The knowledge that a team is currently
lagging 10 points behind the leader does not
provide any information on whether it is still
possible for this team to win the champion-
ship (for instance, if the number of remain-
ing matches is larger than four matches).24
We admit, however, that the 29–34 fixture per-
iod might be viewed as somewhat arbitrary.
On the other hand, starting this measure
much earlier, for example, around the 20th fix-
ture, would heavily increase the number of
teams that are theoretically in Championship/
Relegation contention although they would
not have necessarily been viewed as such at
the time.
Furthermore, we take the criticism of
Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005) on
previous approaches to this type of variables
into account. They argue25 that for answering
23. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for sug-
gesting this aspect to us.
24. Within our sample period, wins are awarded three
points, and a draw is awarded one point to each of both
teams.
25. See Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005, p. 647).
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questions as ‘‘could team x still win the cham-
pionship if it won y% of available points from
its remaining games and other teams that might
be champions won z%of available points from
their remaining games? y is always chosen to
be a high number and z a low number, but
there is no obvious criterion for choosing
the precise values.’’
Our approach differs with respect to the
chosen values on y and z. However, rather
than choosing fixed values for these variables,
we apply a simple rule for our measures: The
Championship Dummy26 is set to 1, in case
that a team is not more than two points
behind the current leader. This would allow
a team to win the championship by either
a higher number of points or a higher
‘‘goals-scored-minus-goals-received’’ value
in the following way: First, the team would
have to win all its own outstanding matches
and the teams that are currently ranked
higher would have to tie at least once in their
remaining matches. This would mean that the
team would end up at least with the same
number of championship points as the cur-
rent leader (or any of the currently better
ranked teams). In case that the team was
the unique end-of-season leader, it would
immediately win the championship. In case
of point equality between the team and the
end-of-season leader, the team could still
win the championship by having a higher
value on ‘‘goals scored-minus-goals-received’’
than its competitor.27 Based on this approach,
depending on the number of remaining
matches, our value for z ranges from 33%
to 89%. The underlying dependence on the
number of remaining matches stems from
the fact that a ‘‘necessary tie’’ in the last
game by the leader refers to a ratio of 33%
(1 point out of 3), whereas one necessary tie
in the last two games refers to 67% (4 points
out of 6).
With respect to our chosen economic re-
gressors, we start by mentioning that the log-
arithmic average admission price (log(Price))
is included in Equation (1) to allow for an
interpretation of the corresponding coefficient
as the price elasticity of attendance demand.
Average admission prices have been calcu-
lated as follows: For each category, that is,
seating and standing accommodation, we
obtained information on the highest and low-
est admission prices. Based on these prices, we
calculated the average price for seating and
standing accommodation. The averages of
both categories were then weighted by their
relative share in stadium capacity. Afterwards,
prices were translated into Euro values (1
Euro5 1.95 DM) and deflated by the German
Consumer Price Index (20045 100). Although
this is the only feasible approach within our
sample period, this measure suffers from its
inability to incorporate the so-called ‘‘Match
of the Day’’ surcharges, but models club-level
admission prices to be constant within a
season.28
In addition, we include ‘‘home market
size,’’ Hmarket to measure the home team’s
market potential, that is, the number of inhabi-
tants within the home team’s hometown
(in 100,000’s). Here, we follow the approach
by Brandes, Franck, and Nu¨esch (2008) in
including male inhabitants, only. Finally,
Unemployed measures the unemployment rate
in the home team’s hometown and thus serves
as an income proxy. In comparison to these
measures, DBtime and Midweek might be
viewed as indirect cost factors: From casual
evidence we know that most visiting fans
travel by train. However, there are significant
differences in train infrastructure between
Eastern and Western Germany resulting in
significant differences in required travel time
for visiting fans. It is thus questionable
whether a measure of absolute distance, such
as distance in kilometers, should be adopted.
Our measure is based on the timetable from
Deutsche Bahn, the German Railway Service
Provider.29 We also include the squared
traveling distance, as we expect marginal dis-
utility to decrease with the travel time. Mid-
week matches, that is, matches played on
26. The derivation of the values for Relegation is
obtained by a similar reasoning.
27. We are aware of the fact that this might appear to
be a rather restrictive criterion for the definition of cham-
pionship contention. However, we decided to rely on this
narrow definition in order to avoid the inclusion of addi-
tional teams that would have had only a theoretical chance
of winning the championship under ‘‘extremely beneficial
conditions.’’
28. As a team’s admission price is an important policy
variable, we readily followed the suggestion of an anony-
mous referee to exclude a team-specific fixed effect from
Equation (1) as this would otherwise have captured a pos-
sible price effect.
29. See the Appendix for a detailed description of
DBtime.
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Monday-Thursday, are assumed to require
additional ‘‘organizational effort’’ from con-
sumers as there is usually less time to leave
from work and reach the stadium in time.
In addition, people will need to get to work
the next day, which might make a match start-
ing at 20:30 possibly less attractive.
Following Ga¨rtner and Pommerehne (1978),
weather-related variables might also be viewed
as ‘‘indirect quality indicators.’’ Within our
specification, we control for average tempera-
ture (Temp) before kick-off in the home team’s
hometown as well as whether there had been
rain (Rain) and/or snow (Snow) before kick-
off. Finally, the variable Fixture accounts
for a possible trend in within-season match
attendance.
In Table 2, we give descriptive statistics
for our control variables.30
C. Measuring Match Uncertainty of Outcome
Within our study, we will rely on a variety
of measures of match uncertainty of outcome.
This is done to account for a possible source
of heterogeneity in previous results: In the sur-
vey by Borland and Macdonald (2003) the
applied measures of match uncertainty differ
significantly across different studies.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. N
Dependent variable
log(adjusted match attendance) 9.48 0.594 7.863 10.834 1369
Team quality
Hstand 9.683 5.234 1 18 1369
Astand 9.774 4.989 1 18 1369
Hstand (LS) 9.968 6.058 0 21 1369
Astand (LS) 10.439 5.84 0 21 1369
HGLM 1.703 1.367 0 6 1328
AGLM 1.118 1.101 0 9 1285
Hbudget 29.375 12.186 7.600 62.8 1369
Abudget 28.036 10.745 7.600 51.6 1369
HREP20 22.339 22.571 0 101.276 1369
AREP20 18.124 13.807 0 53.203 1369
Hseries3 0.031 0.174 0 1 1369
Aseries4 0.009 0.097 0 1 1369
Entertainment proxies
Hprom 0.17 0.376 0 1 1369
Aprom 0.176 0.381 0 1 1369
Championship 0.012 0.111 0 1 1369
Relegation 0.081 0.273 0 1 1369
Economic factors
Dbtime 5.41 3.296 0.17 15.8 1369
(DBtime)2 40.124 46.753 0.029 249.64 1369
log(Price) 2.885 0.286 1.92 3.666 1369
Unemployed 11.69 4.066 3.1 20 1369
Hmarket 2.995 3.723 0.098 16.515 1369
Midweek 0.062 0.241 0 1 1369
Weather variables
Temp 89.689 60.423 86 309 1368
Rain 0.336 0.473 0 1 1369
Snow 0.061 0.24 0 1 1369
Within-season trend
Fixture 18.04 9.516 3 34 1369
30. For all seasons, we dropped the first two fixtures in
order to obtain values on Home: goals last home match
and Away: goals last away match. This explains the small
difference in means for some variables.
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As a starting point, we will use a very sim-
ple measure of match uncertainty, namely,
the absolute difference in league standings
(ADSTAND). This measure is given by
ADSTAND5 jASTANDHSTANDj;ð3Þ
where HSTAND and ASTAND denote the
pre-kick-off league position of the home and
away team, respectively.
Another measure is based on the approach
by Forrest, Simmons, and Buraimo (2005) and
calculated as follows:
FSBijs 5 jPPGis þHAs  PPGsjj;ð4Þ
where PPGs
i and PPGs
j denote the points per
game records for home team i and visiting
team j in season s before the match, respect-
ively. HAs (Home Advantage) was calculated
as the difference between the average number
of points won at home and the number of
points won on the road for all teams in the pre-
vious season.
Regarding the interpretation of our results
on this variable, it is important to understand
the underlying idea of this measure: The
greater the value of this measure, the less
uncertain the outcome of the match is. An
ex-ante perfectly balanced match should show
an FSBs
ij-value of 0. For reasons of readabil-
ity, we will drop the subindexes on FSB in the
remainder of this paper.
In addition to these two measures, we will
also use information from the sports betting
market. Based on quotations from the leading
German bookmaker in the sports betting mar-
ket, ODDSET, we calculate the measure pro-
posed by Theil (1967) by
THEIL 5
X3
i51
pilog

1
pi

;ð5Þ
where pi, i5 1,. . .,3 denotes the probabilities
31
for the three possible match outcomes (home
win, draw, and away win). The smaller the
difference between these probabilities, the
larger the value for THEIL. Thus, we expect
a positive effect from THEIL on attendance
demand.
However, Roy (2004) criticizes Theil’s mea-
sure with respect to its reliance on all possible
match outcomes and proposes an adjustment,
which focuses on the winning probabilities for
the home and away team, only.32 His relative
winning probability measure (REL.WINPROB)
is given by
REL:WINPROB5
X2
k51
pk
p1 þ p2log

p1 þ p2
pk

:
ð6Þ
Finally,wealsodecided to includeaquadratic
specification of the home team’s winning proba-
bility (WINPROB, WINPROBSQR). This is
done to allow for a comparison with previous
results in the literature, which show a concave
relationship between this winning probability
and consumer demand.
We conclude this subsectionwith anoverview
of the expected results on the uncertainty meas-
ures for our empirical analysis (see Table 3).
D. Estimation Procedure
Within this section, we shortly discuss the
underlying idea behind (censored) quantile
regression33 and how this estimation procedure
can be implemented for empirical analyses.
Recall that within our empirical framework
we are interested in estimating the effect of
various measures of match uncertainty (UOO)
on different quantiles of aggregate (adjusted)
match attendance demand in professional
German soccer. The quantile regression model
was originally introduced by Koenker and
Bassett (1978). They argue that the estimation
of regression quantiles yields a much more
complete view of the relationship between
the observations on a dependent variable, here
Dit and a set of regressors, here x, z, e, w,
UOO. For the hth-quantile, the model can be
written as
QuanthðDitjUOOit; xit; zit; eit;witÞ
5 UOOitbþ x#itfþ z#itcþ e#itnþ w#itk;
31. In Germany, bookmakers do not give probabili-
ties but betting quotes only. For a derivation of the cor-
responding probabilities, see the Appendix.
32. His argument is based on the fact that, given equal
winning probabilities for the home and away team,
a changing value for the draw probability would result
in a decrease of THEIL. Thus, a decrease in THEIL
may not always be driven by a decrease in match uncer-
tainty of outcome. Consider, for instance, the draw prob-
ability changing from 50% to 60% while home and away
win probabilities change from 25% to 20% each. In this
case, the relative uncertainty of home and away win will
not be affected.
33. For excellent introductions, the interested reader
is referred to Koenker (2005) and Buchinsky (1998).
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which holds if
QuanthðeitjUOOit; xit; zit; eit;witÞ 5 0:ð7Þ
However, due to the existence of capacity
constraints at stadiums, we may not always
be able to observe ‘‘true’’ ticket demand, as
some observations may be censored. This
means that we observe values on all exogenous
variables for every observation within our
sample, whereas for some observations of
the dependent variable, we only know that
ticket demand was at least as high as the
match-specific stadium capacity Ct. In the lit-
erature, Dit is thus referred to as a limited
dependent variable. This requires us to distin-
guish between attendance demand for a match,
denoted by D*it and attendance at this match,
denoted by Dit, where ticket demand equals
attendance as long as the stadium’s capacity
constraint is not met. This point can be made
more precisely by writing down the following
latent variable model:
D*it 5 UOOitbþ x#itfþ z#itc
þ e#itnþ w#itkþ eit
ð8Þ
and
Dit 5
Cit : D
*
it  Cit
D*it : D
*
it ,Cit
:
8<
:
Based on this latent variable model, we can
write our estimation model as
QuanthðDitjUOOit; xit; zit; eit;witÞ
5 minðCit;UOOitbþ x#itfþ z#itc
þ e#itnþ w#itkÞ
ð9Þ
and it follows that
@Quanth½D*it jUOOit; xit; zit; eit;wit
@UOOit
5 b;ð10Þ
that is, b is the partial effect from UOO on
attendance demand rather than attendance.
With respect to the implementation of our
estimation procedure, it is important to point
at the fact that the censored quantile regression
(CQR) coefficient estimate, for example, on
UOO, b^, can only be calculated from those
observations within a sample for which the con-
ditional quantile is not in the unobserved part
of the distribution. Therefore, we need to drop
that portion of the data for which the condi-
tional quantile is in the unobserved part of
the distribution. ‘‘It follows that the calculated
asymptotic covariancematrix has to be adjusted
for the fact that the estimation is conditioned
on the inclusion of only the observations for
which’’ the conditional quantile is in the ob-
served part of the distribution.34 Of course, the
set of observations for which the conditional
quantile exceeds the censoring point is not
known ex-ante. However, Buchinsky (1994)
suggested an iterative linear programming
algorithm (ILPA) that uses an iterative proce-
dure to determine the set of observations that
could have been excluded from the estimation.
In particular, he proposes a design matrix
bootstrap estimator for the asymptotic covari-
ance matrix. Within this paper, we follow his
empirical strategy (see also below).
Another comment is required on specific
observations forwhich there isnot sufficientvari-
ationinthedependentvariable,asnoinformation
about the coefficients of interest can be inferred
from such observations. For example, within
our data set, matches involving Bayern Munich
as the visiting team are found to be sold out in
95% of all times. As a result, the introduction
of an additional regressor controlling for Bayern
Munichbeing the visiting teamwouldnot lead to
a reasonable estimate for theassociatedmarginal
effectas95%oftheseobservationsdonotcontain
information on the influence from Bayern
Munich being the visiting team (and all other
regressors) on ticket demand: Theoretically, the
coefficient on Munich could have been ‘‘þ‘,’’
thereby leading to ticket demand exceeding sta-
dium capacity. As a result, we decided to drop
those observations35 fromour sample.However,
weneedtoemphasizethattheexclusionofDerbies
and Bayern Munich’s away matches is not inher-
ently driven by the fact that those are censored
observations but by their lack of variation for
the dependent variableDit. As a result, our pop-
ulation under study can best be characterized as
all matches that are neither Derbies or Bayern
Munich’s away matches in the German Bunde-
sliga. The reader should note that although the
size of b^red for the reduced sample will generally
bedifferent from b^tot for the total sample,
36 thees-
timator is still
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
-consistent and asymptotically
34. See Buchinsky (1998) p. 120–1.
35. A similar reasoning applies to so-called ‘‘Derbies,’’
leading to the exclusion of Derby matches from our sam-
ple, too.
36. See, for example, Preisser and Qaqish (1996).
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normal for the new population parameters
(Buchinsky, 1998).
To estimate the model in Equation (1) we
use Stata 9. However, obtaining estimates
on CQR with observation specific censoring
values has not yet been implemented in Stata.
Therefore, we rely on the ILPA implemen-
tation for Stata by Robert Vigfusson.37 This
code is then adjusted38 to allow for observa-
tion-varying censoring values. In addition
we adjust the ILPA code such that it becomes
the modified iterative linear programming
algorithm.39 Standard errors on all estimates
are obtained by performing 2000 bootstrap-
ping replications. Due to this procedure, the
possible existence of heteroskedasticity is
already taken into account for the calculation
of the standard errors.
Concluding this section, we would like to
comment on the existence of clustered obser-
vations within our data set. Clustering affects
the standard errors of our estimates as it refers
to a situation in which there are ‘‘groups’’ of
observations, which are correlated within the
group but are uncorrelated across groups.
Within our sample, clustering should be ex-
pected to be present for the following reason:
Each season, each team plays 17 matches at
home, which results in 17 attendance figures
for our data set. However, these attendance
figures comprise two different groups of con-
sumers, namely, season ticket and match
day–ticket holders. Given that the number
of season ticket holders remains constant
for all 17 matches, shocks in season ticket
demand will in general affect match day–ticket
availability for the whole season. An alterna-
tive source of shocks affecting the ‘‘group’’ of
home matches by a team in a particular season
might be the kind of media coverage within
a season: The way that team performance is
judged by the media may depend on their
expectations, which are often based on player
transfers for a particular season. This might
also affect consumer demand for match day
tickets. To allow for such types of clustering,
we calculate clustering adjusted bootstrapped
standard errors.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Within this section, we present our estima-
tion results for CQR, OLS regression and cen-
sored normal regression (Tobit). Following
our reasoning from Section III, the dependent
variable in all models is the logarithmic number
of adjusted match attendance.
When interpreting the results, the reader
should recall from Equation (10) that the esti-
mated marginal effects in censored quantile
and censored normal regression models refer
to the percentage change in attendance demand,
whereas the estimated coefficients from the
OLS model refers to a percentage change in
actual attendance. For this reason, we place
more emphasis on the CQR and Tobit results,
as from a team owner’s perspective, knowing
the behavior of the underlying demand func-
tion should be particularly interesting as, for
instance, it is relevant for the adoption of opti-
mal pricing schemes. Observed attendance, on
the contrary, should already be seen as the
consumers’ response to such schemes.
An additional note is required concerning
the number of observations used in each esti-
mation.40 As the reader will note from Table 4
below, these numbers differ across Tobit, OLS
and different quantile estimations. This is
because we rely on the ILPA algorithm to
implement the CQR estimators (see also
above). The iterative nature of this algorithm
comes from the fact that at the beginning of
the algorithm an uncensored quantile regres-
sion model is fitted to the data and the asso-
ciated predicted values for each observation
are calculated. In case that the predicted value
is greater than the corresponding censoring
value, this observation is excluded from the
data set and, in the next iteration step, the
model is estimated again based on the remain-
ing observations. Convergence is then defined
TABLE 3
Expected Signs for b-Coefficients
Variable Expected Sign
ADSTAND ()
FSB ()
THEIL (+)
REL.WINPROB (+)
WINPROB (+)
WINPROBSQR ()
37. The code is available from http://faculty.chica-
gogsb.edu/timothy.conley/research/qrcode/quantile.html
38. The software code is available from the authors on
request.
39. Fitzenberger (1994) has shown that this algorithm
is more likely to achieve convergence than ILPA. 40. See also Buchinsky (1998), p. 121.
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to be achieved if the set of observations is the
same for two subsequent iteration steps. As
can be seen fromTable 4, the number of obser-
vations used is decreasing in the quantile of
interest. However, even for the 90% quantile,
the number of observations is always strictly
greater than 400, which we regard as suffi-
ciently high in order to yield reliable results.
Our empirical results on the match uncer-
tainty of outcome measures for the 10%,
25%, 50%, 75% and 90% quantiles are given
in Table 4. The different UOO model specifi-
cations are separated by two horizontal lines,
where each model includes only one measure
for the ex-ante degree of match uncertainty of
outcome. It is immediately revealed that UOO
does not seem to be an important influence
factor for match attendance demand: Irrespec-
tive of the underlying measure, we do not find
any statistically significant effects for the 10%–
75% quantiles. A noteworthy exception to this
is the 25% quantile in the FSB specification,
for which we find the theoretically expected
effect that an ex-ante less balanced match will
face lower attendance demand. Interestingly,
however, the results are much clearer for the
90% quantile: Here, three out of five model
specifications reveal a statistically significant
influence from match uncertainty of outcome
on consumer demand; moreover, these effects
support Rottenberg’s uncertainty of outcome
hypothesis. For ADSTAND, we see that
increasing ADSTAND by 1 leads to a 1.6%
reduction in attendance demand.
Based on the FSB specification, we obtain
the result that an increase in FSB by 1 point
will lower consumer demand by 12% (at the
25% quantile) and by 20% (at the 90% quan-
tile). Although these numbers may seem
extraordinarily large, it should be mentioned
that within our sample period the average
value for FSB lay around 0.81 points, that
is, the current average FSB value is smaller
than the (hypothetical) change that is associ-
ated with the marginal effect for FSB. Given
that the measure is defined on the interval
between 0 (perfect uncertainty) and 3 (no un-
certainty), a change of FSB by 1 point should
certainly be viewed as a strong decrease in
match uncertainty. Intuitively speaking, and
viewing match uncertainty to be continuously
decreasing in FSB, we could say that increas-
ing FSB, for example, from 0.81 to 1.81 points
would correspond to a decrease in match
uncertainty from 73% [(3  0.81)/3] to 40%
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[(3  1.81)/3]. This means that match uncer-
tainty is almost cut in half. Thus, in our opin-
ion, the size of the marginal effects for FSB
should be attributed to the associated strong
deterioration in ex-ante match uncertainty.
Our results for the home team’s winning
probability (WINPROB) support a non-linear
specification for this measure: For the 90%
quantile, we find a concave relationship between
the home team’s winning probability and atten-
dance demand. The presented coefficients refer
to the percentage change in attendance demand
for a one percentage-point increase in the home
team’s winning probability, for instance, from
45% to 46%41. Based on this specification, we
find attendance demand to be maximized when
the home team’s winning probability reaches
53%. As can be seen from our literature review,
this result is in line with previous findings in the
literature (see Section II).
In order to provide the reader with a more
detailed view on our empirical findings, we
also give a graphical illustration for our esti-
mation results on the uncertainty measures
in Figure 1. For each uncertainty measure,
the corresponding Tobit estimation results
(point estimate and 95% confidence interval
bounds) were chosen as benchmark and quan-
tile estimates were calculated in 10% steps,
ranging from 10% to 90% quantiles.
Concluding this section, two important
aspects about our empirical results require
special mention. First, match uncertainty of
outcome is only found to affect attendance
demand on a 10% level of significance. Com-
bining this fact with our estimation results on
team quality factors from Tables A1-A3 in
appendix, we come to a similar conclusion
as Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002), namely
that a team’s reputation (and current rank-
ing) seems to be the main driving force for
match attendance demand in the German
Bundesliga. In other words, uncertainty of out-
come is obtained to be a ‘‘second-order’’ influ-
ence factor only. This point is further
strengthened by the interesting result that in
the period 1999–2004 at least 75% of all
matches in the German Bundesliga did not
show any reliance onmatch uncertainty of out-
come measures. On such empirical grounds,
the question can be raised whether the exclu-
sive adoption of revenue-sharing systems can
be expected to ‘‘get the job done’’ for associ-
ation officials, a question to which we will turn
now in our concluding discussion.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to analyze
whether previous results describing the effect
of uncertainty of outcome on match atten-
dance could have been driven by heterogeneity
in fan demand and/or the use of various meas-
ures of uncertainty. To answer this question,
we adopted quantile regression methods on
individual match attendance demand for a
variety of uncertainty measures. Following the
arguments by Koenker and Bassett (1978),
we argued that quantile regression would pro-
vide a much better understanding of the con-
ditional distribution of match attendance
demand.
Based on data from professional German
soccer in the period 1999–2004, our empirical
analysis clearly reveals two important
facts: First, match UOO is found to be only a
‘‘second-order’’ influence factor for attendance
demand. Statistically much more important is
a team’s reputation (in terms of its performance
within previous years) and current ranking. This
result is in line with the previous findings by
Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002). The second
aspect relates to the question whether UOO is
a relevant influence factor for all quantiles in
thedistributionof consumerdemand, aquestion
that is clearly negated by our findings: Match
uncertainty of outcome is consistently found
(for three out of five UOO measures) to affect
high-demandmatches only.42Unlike the finding
from CQR methods, Tobit or OLS estimation
procedures do not obtain this result. In our
opinion, this stresses the importance of quantile
regressionmethods for the analysis of consumer
demand in general, and the demand for sport, in
particular.
Regarding policy implications for associa-
tion officials, we come up with the following
41. This can be seen as follows: Information on the
home team’s winning probability was included in decimal
form, that is, 45% was expressed as 0.45 rather than 45.
However, following Wooldridge (2003, p. 43), using 45
instead of 0.45 would result in b^45 5 1=100  b^0:45. As
the dependent variable is measured as logarithmic match
attendance demand, the marginal effect from the home
team’s winning probability (e.g. 45%–46%) on demand
is given by b^45  100 percent. Clearly this is equivalent to
b^0:45 percent.
42. As we are concernedwith this finding’s robustness,
For reasons of simplicity, we abstract from the FSB result
for the 25% quantile, as discussed in Section IV.
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suggestions: If association and league officials
aim at increasing a league’s degree of match
uncertainty of outcome, it is not sufficient
to simply redistribute revenues, for example,
from the UEFA Champions League to non-
participating teams. Our findings provide
strong evidence that redistribution schemes
will only affect attendance demand as far as
teams facing low demand (call them ‘‘low-
demand’’ teams) are able to efficiently invest
this money into player talent. As long as this
cannot be achieved by those teams, they will
FIGURE 1
Results from Quantile Regression.
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not be able to generate additional interest as
a higher budget itself does not increase atten-
dance demand (see the results in the appen-
dix). Although this may seem obvious from
a single team’s economic point of view, our
findings suggest that the importance of effi-
cient investment allocations by ‘‘low-demand’’
teams is also relevant for the ‘‘high-demand’’
teams, because of the UOOmechanism: These
are the teams that exclusively profit from an
increase in match uncertainty of outcome
when playing ‘‘previously low-demand’’ teams
at home, that is, teams that used to be ‘‘low-
demand’’ ones but have learned to invest their
money more efficiently, thereby increasing
their associated team quality. Such a scenario
would certainly qualify to be termed a classical
‘‘win-win situation’’: ‘‘Low-demand’’ teams
would become ‘‘more interesting’’ for their
own customers at home and would also pose
a positive externality when playing ‘‘high-
demand’’ teams on the road.
In order to achieve this goal, however, we
believe that the promotion of additional
governance standards is indispensable for
increasing managerial professionalism in
the day-to-day operations of soccer clubs.
At first sight, the idea that those in charge
of the team should use the redistributed
money wisely and make the ‘‘right’’ invest-
ment decisions might seem to be more an
issue of ‘‘good judgment’’ and less an issue
of governance standards.43
However, governance standards have the
potential to promote ‘‘good judgment’’ in soc-
cer clubs by altering the selection procedures
and incentives for managerial candidates
and by improving the accountability and con-
trol of decision makers. Currently, we still see a
lot of potential in improving the quality of the
adopted governance standards: In Germany,
for example, registered associations called
‘‘eingetragener Verein’’ are still required by
league regulation to remain majority owners
of their specific Bundesliga teams. Managed
by representatives, who are elected by the
members of the Verein, this special form of
non-profit organization is not even required
to publish its accounts. As there is no cheap
and reliable mechanism to aggregate the pref-
erences of a heterogeneous and large group of
people like the members, the elected represen-
tatives de facto seize control of German soccer
clubs. They have the discretionary freedom to
derive personal utility from the fame and pub-
licity associated with sporting success. At the
same time they are not personally liable for the
financial losses of the club.44 The history of
German clubs entering into insolvency pro-
ceedings and accused of fraudulent practices
is rather rich. The appointment of managerial
staff without any formal training and without
a track record in management and account-
ing is still common practice in this environ-
ment. Against this background governance
standards leading to a selection of manage-
rial staff with relevant skills and enhancing
the accountability of decision makers are
likely to increase the advent of ‘‘good judg-
ment’’ in German football. As the lack of
professional management does not seem to
be a German exception in Europe, various
national football governing bodies as well
as UEFA have started attempts to improve
this situation.45 Our findings thus shed
a new and positive light on this current
attempt of UEFA to promote standards of
‘‘good governance’’ in an industry with
a poor track record concerning the selection
of managerial candidates and the monitoring
of decision makers.
APPENDIX
Within this appendix, we show how to translate betting
quotations into probabilities, how the values on the vari-
able DBtime have been obtained, and present estimation
results on team quality regressors and a team’s admission
price.
A. Derivation of Probabilities from Betting Quotations
In the German betting market, bookmakers do not
quote probabilities for the different match outcomes,
43. We are grateful to an anonymous referee who
attracted our attention to this issue.
44. See Dietl and Franck (2007) for an extensive dis-
cussion of this aspect.
45. UEFA’s Club Licensing System was approved in
2002 and first introduced in the 2004/05 season. The idea
was to set a common minimum standard in five key areas
for entry into UEFA competitions across Europe. The cri-
teria used by UEFA fall into five areas—sporting, infra-
structure, personnel and administration, legal, and
financial. By setting a minimum standard, the license nec-
essarily falls short of the most stringent standards set for
some criteria in some countries; however, it represents
a significant regulatory hurdle for clubs in many countries
where regulation is less robust. To improve the perfor-
mance of these standards, the UEFA Club Licensing sys-
tem is monitored by spot checks to see that the system is
correctly implemented by clubs and national associations.
Finally, a new tougher licensing system (version 2.0) will
come into effect in the 2008/09 season.
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but give payment quotations. Let us clarify the derivation
by an example. In the 1999/2000 season, on December 4,
Stuttgart (at home) played 1860 Munich. The quotations
were ‘‘2 to 1 for Stuttgart winning,’’ ‘‘2.75 to 1 for a draw’’
and ‘‘2.6 to 1 forMunich winning.’’ In other words, book-
makers would pay 2 Euro per Euro betted in the case of
Stuttgart winning. Based on these quotations, the
‘‘implicit probabilities’’ were 0.5 (1/2), 0.36 (1/2.75) and
0.38 (1/2.6). However, these values would not satisfy
the restriction that probabilities need to sum up to 1. This
is due to the fact that these probabilities include earning
spreads of the bookmakers. Thus, we need to adjust the
‘‘probabilities’’ once more by
p1 5 0:50:5þ0:36þ0:38 5 :40
p2 5 0:360:5þ0:36þ0:38 5 :29
p3 5 0:380:5þ0:36þ0:38 5 :31:
These probabilities can be used to calculate THEIL
and REL.WINPROB.
B. Obtaining DBtime
Our measure is based on the timetable from Deutsche
Bahn, the German Railway Service Provider.
We obtained the travel times by submitting the follow-
ing information on the internet site (http://www.bahn.de)
of Deutsche Bahn:
1. From: Visiting Team’s Hometown (Main Station)
2. To: Home Team’s Hometown (Main Station)
3. Outward Journey: Saturday.46
4. Arrival Time: 14:30h to 15:00h
5. Means of Transport: all except InterCity Express
(ICE).47
The arrival time was chosen to ensure between 30 and
60 min for travel time frommain station to stadium before
kick-off. Usually, special ‘‘fan trains’’ are organized for
visiting teams. However, to the best of our knowledge,48
these trains do not include ICE-trains, which results in
longer travel times.
C. Estimation Results on Team Quality Control
Regressors and Admission Price
Within this subsection, we present our empirical results
on team quality factors and the home team’s admission
price (Table A1–A3). As all empirical results are in line with
predictions from economic theory, we do not provide any
additional interpretation of these results. Noteworthy, how-
ever, is the fact that the insignificance of certain quality fac-
tors cannot be attributed tomulticollinearity; for all models,
we calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) based on the
OLS specification. For all team quality factors, we obtained
VIFs between 1 and 4. Following Neter, Wasserman, and
Kunter (1990), however, there is evidence for multicolli-
nearity if the largest VIF is above the value of 10. These
values were only obtained for our distance measure and
the home team’s winning probability (both of which follow
a quadratic specification, because it seems appropriate from
an economic theory’s point of view). As a result, we are not
too concerned about multicollinearity as an important fac-
tor for our team quality regressors’ results.
46. It should be mentioned that for reasons of simplic-
ity we did not adjust times for matches on other weekdays.
Saturday matches account for 65% of all matches in our
sample. In addition, travel times usually do not signifi-
cantly differ across days.
47. The ICE is the fastest and most expensive train
type that is currently operated by Deutsche Bahn.
48. We are grateful to Norbert Schneider from Deut-
sche Bahn for providing us with this information.
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